Communication links are a key dimension for implementation of European Union (EU) policies in non-member states because EU influence abroad is otherwise severely hindered. 
Introduction
Although Europeanization studies in EU accession countries have gained prominence with the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Bache 2010) , the influence of EU policies in non-member states (NMS) has been largely neglected and requires theorising that accounts for differences from accession and member states (Schimmelfennig 2009 ). This article addresses this gap and simultaneously links it with insights from the literature on implementation, organisational sociology and social networks. If
Europeanization is ultimately about EU impact on processes and policy output then it should be linked with the implementation literature as an established area of public policy research that deals with how policy is "translated" into "action". The link is theoretically useful and points at an area of study where EU influence becomes most tangible in form of EU projects set in time and space. Furthermore, it allows insulating direct from indirect forms of EU influence as well as from non-EU driven change such as socialisation and lesson-drawing (Schimmelfennig 2009: p.8) . Direct EU influence is therefore understood as the EU's ability to successfully pursue its policy objectives through implementation of its projects and programmes in NMS. Better analytical focus becomes possible on unfolding Europeanization processes in a 'controlled environment' to provide insights into a new area that might otherwise be obfuscated by their complexity (Zahariadis 2008: p.223 ).
In contrast to accession and member states, EU policy implementation in NMS is more limited. The EU operates external policies outside of its legal reach, without sanctioning system, lacking substantial incentives, meaningful conditionality and administrative capabilities while simultaneously facing uncertainties about the appropriate means to shape the implementation target "international migration", about its scale and "logics". This setting creates a gap between Brussels, where policy objectives are set, and the implementation context in NMS, where networks try to produce the intended change. Implementation networks emerge around EU policy objectives, are composed of governmental, international and non-governmental organisations, have a polycentric structure and are stable beyond the normal three-year lifecycle of individual EU projects. implementation. Consequently, policy is shaped along the way rather than following a template set in Brussels and EU influence can become obscured in this interactive process.
External migration policy presents an interesting case for studying Europeanization as a EU priority for its 'neighbourhood'. The EU has hierarchical intentions in this internally motivated external policy field. This means it aims at restricting migration movements into its territory through external cooperation and does not differentiate its policy objectives much between European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries. Apart from decentralised funding to NMS agencies, the Commission has implemented centralised thematic instruments under implementation since 2001. If the implementation of centrally managed programmes in a EU priority policy area does not correspond to a hierarchical process then Europeanization is unlikely to be controlled by Brussels in other external policy areas where programmes are decentralised or seen as less important.
Drawing upon 59 interviews in Brussels, Morocco and Ukraine, this article uses social network analysis (SNA) to examine country cases that are EU targets of substantial external migration projects and that are explicitly left without membership perspective -thus making them novel ground for Europeanization studies. The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 adapts findings of the Europeanization literature to NMS contexts; section 2 supplements them with the literature on implementation, social networks and organisational sociology; 
Theorising Europeanization in non-member states
EU influence on polity, policy and politics at domestic level has been conceptualised as Europeanization and provides a substantive field of scholarly literature (see for example Graziano & Vink 2006) . The literature has established a range of domestic responses to accommodate EU influence (Börzel & Risse 2003: pp.69-70) , which indicates the underlying interpretation processes at domestic level. Similarly implementation research stresses that policy is not set in stone at the point of decision-making but undergoes challenging processes that can drive policy output away from original intentions (for an overview of the implementation literature see Hill and Hupe 2002) . Indeed Europeanization research found that interpretation helps translating policies into national contexts and policies are at times deliberately vague for that purpose (Mörth 2003) . Accounts of domestic 'fit' and 'misfit' with adaptational pressure from the EU level seem inadequate (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006) and Europeanization models should accommodate the interpretation and communication processes of organisations. Research has confirmed particularly the importance of administrative capacities and veto players on the one side and willingness of domestic actors on the other for Europeanization processes (Treib 2008: 10-11, 17) . Besides domestic factors, the literature on member and accession countries highlights the importance of EU 'modes of governance' (Bulmer & Radaelli 2004; Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999) . In contrast, directed EU influence in NMS will be less dependent on what "comes down" from the EU level due to three limitations:
(1) EU external policies are outside the reach of the EU legal framework, which binds member states to implement directives and regulations. In contrast to accession countries that need to transpose all EU policies as a precondition for membership, other states are under no such obligation.
(2) In the accession process, substantial incentives are the central 'mechanism' for Europeanization with membership as the ultimate reward (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005) . The ENP was created as the most similar framework to membership on offer for NMS. However, it 'lacks any substantial incentives…' and has therefore 'been deprived of any substantial leverage' (Whitman and Wolff 2010: p.13). Although some incentives such as visa facilitation agreements are on the table to achieve policy change in NMS (Trauner & Kruse 2008) , these incentives are too 'chunky' to be used in a fine-grained manner that corresponds with the complex realities of implementing numerous individual projects. has never been applied. Non-compliance did not lead to EU sanctions because individual Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) were protecting their portfolios from contamination by other DG's policy objectives and broader foreign policy interests prevailed over migration policy interests even in this priority area (Wunderlich 2010: 266-267 ). This reflects a broader picture of inconsistent application of conditionality in NMS (Schimmelfennig 2009: p.16 ).
These limitations of EU influence in NMS underscore the role of communication links in the implementation context. Organisational sociology helps to conceptualise the role of communication for implementing organisations to make sense of their environment.
The role of communication links in implementation networks of EU external policies
The basic proposition that communication structures are central to implementation finds support in the literature on organisational sociology. Any organisation that wants to act purposefully in its environment needs to be able to make sense of what is going on around it (Daft & Weick 1984) . Since the implementation of EU policies depends on cooperation because the EU does not possess administrative authority in NMS, implementers need to be able to (a) make sense of the policy object "migration", (b) identify capable cooperation partners and (c) achieve enough mutual understanding to follow through with joint projects.
However, addressing these challenges is difficult. Boswell (2009: 170) In contrast to top-down approaches that assume a hierarchical "implementation chain" that under the right conditions could perfectly translate a political decision into a matching outcome (Sabatier & Mazmanian 1979; Gunn 1978) , bottom-up approaches dismiss the notion that implementers are mere tools in the hands of political actors. These studies point at pressures and uncertainties that affect implementers (Lipsky 1971; Brunsson 1989) Implementation is consequently a dynamic and inherently political process of negotiation between actors as in Barrett and Fudge's (1981: p.4) understanding of a 'policy-action relationship' in which policy objectives are interpreted, modified and in some cases subverted. Accordingly, the existence of EU external policy objectives says little about whether or how they are put into practice (Bicchi 2010; Wunderlich 2010) .
Europeanization processes can alter opportunity structures and lead to 'differential empowerment of actors' (Knill & Lehmkuhl 1999: p.2; Risse et al 2001: p.11) . Functionally driven implementation networks do not guarantee that communication links are complete or that information circulates evenly as shown in the literature on social networks (Festinger et al 1950) . Communication gaps can be assumed within formal structures even where organisations are functionally relevant to each other and especially in an international setting.
Organisations that bridge gaps are important for network communication for two reasons. (1) Granovetter ( Especially in its relations with neighbouring countries, migration policy has become a EU priority. Its hierarchical intentions mean that policy objectives are relatively undifferentiated between NMS in this internally motivated external policy field. Multi-annual action plans state objectives like improving asylum systems, strengthening border control capacities, enhancing document security, readmission programmes and limited initiatives to cooperate on labour migration and linking migration and development policy. Even in Morocco where the EU programme is broadest and touches lightly on migration and development and labour migration initiatives that are not addressed in Ukraine, it follows the aim to restrict migration into EU member states (Wunderlich 2010: pp.254-260) . The undifferentiated nature of EU policy objectives also reflects in the structure of the implementation network as illustrated in Figure 1 agreement between Morocco and UNHCR offered the opportunity to improve lacking state assistance and address asylum-seekers' needs after more than five years of struggle. The Delegation in Rabat communicated substantial shortcomings in the asylum system to its headquarters. However, Brussels simply assumed that the agreement itself would resolve these shortcomings instead of supporting the continuing implementation of its objectives. 8 Coordination issues between Rabat and Brussels with inadequate feedback and follow-up can hence seriously undermine EU objectives. Despite the significant shortcomings mentioned above, communication gaps might be 'smaller' in the European 'neighbourhood' where EU and individual member states' relations with NMS are 'denser' and actors are more knowledgeable regarding the implementation context than with countries further afield. However given that migration is a cross-border phenomenon and that EU concerns run particularly high regarding illegal migration, the level of interdependence with neighbouring countries is correspondingly higher and so is EU interest regarding migration projects. In consequence, communication gaps with neighbours are likely to matter more for projects from a EU perspective than with other NMS.
Alternative communication links: the role of international organisations
Only rarely is the role of IOs conceptualised for Europeanization processes in NMS. The EU mobilises IOs to increase the legitimacy of its interventions. However, IOs are not only 'agents of EU-ization' as implementers of EU projects because they depend on member states' funding. IOs are also balancing EU advances through their mandates and broader membership including sending and transit countries of migrants to the EU (Lavenex 2007) .
As established organisations with their own agendas, IOs can also act autonomously beyond the delegated authority of their member states (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Loescher 2001) .
Regarding implementation processes, IOs' roles are best described as agents and catalysts of Europeanization.
In IOM's pro-activeness and broker role paired with the Commission's disconnectedness from implementation in NMS produce at times unease amongst its staff and national donors. practices to its widely interpreted mandate (Meyer & Rowan 1977) .
In contrast, UNHCR's mandate as guardian of international refugee law make the EU receptive for critical comments because it provides legitimacy at the planning stage and valuable first-hand information (Klaauw 2002 (Thouez & Channac 2006: 384-385) . In a similar vein, UNHCR contributes to spreading EU problem perceptions among NGOs in NMS by channelling EU-funding and engaging them in actions and policy objectives that they hitherto resented. The constructed nature of problem perceptions, solutions and interpretation of EU policy objectives puts the notion of objectifiable 'fit' and 'misfit' with local context in question and underlines social constructivist notions that IOs can fix meaning (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) .
Conclusions
The NMS context poses challenges that limit EU control over implementation processes and 
Notes
1 Among others, semi-structured interviews explored actors' influence on EU implementation dynamics, relations with other implementers and their experience with programming, monitoring, evaluation and feedback. In addition, each interviewee was asked to fill in a survey how important they rated their links with other implementers. Interview coding was carried out via qualitative data software NVIVO. Interviews and survey combined provided data about communication links that was processed via UCINET and Netdraw for quantitative social network analysis. Data and copies of the interview schedule and survey are available from the author. 2 In 2010, DG JLS was split into DG Justice and DG Home Affairs, which bears responsibility for migration policy. DG Development is responsible for policies towards African, Caribbean and Pacific countries while DG RELEX covers all other states. Due to its responsibility for the ENP as the main area where external migration policy is implemented,
